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Johnson v. United States: The Impact on
Texas' Habitual Offender Statute
by EMILY FRANCES LYNCH*
Introduction
Three-strike and habitual offender statutes enhance sentences for
criminal offenders who commit repeated enumerated felonies. These habitual
offender statutes are now ubiquitous throughout the United States, ostensibly
seeking to both curb repeat criminal activity and prevent "dangerous persons"
from reentering society.' In 2015, a federal habitual offender law took a hit
with the Supreme Court's ruling in Johnson v. United States.2 In Johnson, the
Supreme Court held the residual clause of a federal three-strike law
enhancement scheme void for vagueness under the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause.3 A year later, the Court ruled that because Johnson was a
substantive rule change, it should be applied retroactively. Although the
Court's holding specifically applied to a federal sentencing enhancement
scheme, the holding likely extends to state habitual offender statutes.
After reviewing a few state sentencing enhancement statutes that allow
sentencing enhancement for crimes committed in other states, it became
evident that the foreign jurisdiction clause in Texas' habitual offender statute
strikes chords of similarity with the residual clause held vague in Johnson.
This Note will thus analyze Johnson's effect on the foreign jurisdiction
enhancement clause of the Texas habitual offender statute. By comparing
* J.D. Candidate 2018, University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Special
thanks to Professor Evan Lee for his invaluable guidance and continued contributions throughout
the research, writing, and editing process.
1. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N., 114TH CONG., REP. ON CAREER OFFENDER SENTENCING
ENHANCEMENTS 2 (2016).
2. Johnsonv. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2563 (2015).
3. Id. at 2563.
4. Welchv. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257 (2016) (quoting Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S.
348, 353 (2004) (explaining "by striking down the residual clause as void for vagueness, Johnson
changed the substantive reach of the Armed Career Criminal Act, altering 'the range of conduct or
the class of persons that the [Act] punishes"').
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the federal statute with Texas's enhancement statute, this Note will highlight
the Due Process issues similarly present in Texas' habitual offender statute.
To support the vagueness problems in Texas' habitual offender statute,
this Note will first provide a history of vagueness doctrine and its evolution.
The history of vagueness doctrine provides a context for understanding the
Court's decision in Johnson, and accordingly, this section will lead into an
outline of the considerations that supported the Court's decision to hold the
residual clause unconstitutionally vague in Johnson. After explaining the
Johnson holding, this analysis will then argue that state habitual offender
statutes that allow sentencing enhancement for foreign crimes (crimes
committed in other states) operate similarly to federal sentencing
enhancement statutes and thus may be subject to Johnson problems. In
particular, this Note will then apply the Johnson considerations, to Texas'
Foreign Jurisdiction clause, and following this application, this Note will
provide three potential remedies to this problem.
I. The History of Three-Strike Laws
While an offender's past criminal activity has long played a role in
sentencing, namely in enhancing the overall sentence of a particular
offender, the crusade against repeat criminal conduct was bolstered in 1984
with the Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA"). 6  The ACCA created a
sentencing scheme by which career offenders,7 or persons committing repeat
"crimes of violence" and or "controlled substance offenses,"9 would receive
sentencing enhancement if the offender had "previously been convicted of
5. The following represent appellate cases adjudicated under the foreign jurisdiction clause
of Texas' habitual offender statute. It is worth mentioning that few cases adjudicated under the
foreign jurisdiction clause are appealed, meaning many more cases not cited in this Note are likely
affected by this statute. See generally White v. State, 2003 WL 865351 (Tex. App. Mar. 6, 2003,
pet. ref'd); Prudholmv. State, 274 S.W.3d 236 (Tex. App. 2008) aff'd, 333 S.W.3d 590 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2011); Wagnerv. State, 2009 WL 838187, at *15 (Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2009); Outlandv. State,
389 S.W.3d 346 (2012); Andersonv. State, 394 S.W.3d 531, 535-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Lott
v. State, 2016 WL 1298962 (Tex. App. Mar. 31,2016) reh g overruled (May 11, 2016)petition for
discretionary review refused (Aug. 24, 2016).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 994(h) (2016).
7. "Career criminal offenders" willbe defined by this Note as persons convicted of previous
crimes that qualify under the particular habitual offender statute in question. Statutes vary widely
with respect to which crimes "count." That wide variance, and the unpredictability it brings, is
what creates the vagueness problems in some of these statutes.
8. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N., 114TH CONG., REP. ON CAREER OFFENDER SENTENCING
ENHANCEMENTS, at 7 n.7 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 994(h)).
9. Id.
188 [Vol. 45:1
IMPACTS OF JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
two or more prior felonies."o,1i Drafters argued that previous criminal
activity was important to sentencing for its predictive value.12  Prior
convictions warranted sentencing enhancements because "a defendant's
record of past criminal conduct is directly relevant . . . . the specific factors
included in §4A1.1 and §4A1.3 [of the United States Sentencing Guidelines]
are consistent with the extant empirical research assessing correlat[ions] of
recidivism and patterns of career criminal behavior."3 The ACCA has
undergone many changes since its original passage, 4 though the original
intent of the statute has remained intact. The ACCA has provided the states
with a model for their own habitual offender laws.'5
Opponents of habitual offender sentencing have long raised
constitutional objections, primarily that such sentencing violates the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. 6 The following
are commonly repeated claims against the constitutionality of three-strike
and other habitual offender statutes under the Eighth Amendment: recidivist
statutes (1) punish a defendant's status, not the underlying crime; (2) add
punishment for crimes and sentences previously served; (3) and these
sentencing enhancements are imposed only at the will of the prosecuting
attorney. i7 Courts have rejected each of these Eighth Amendment
arguments. i However, some habitual offender laws may violate a different
constitutional prohibition, namely the Due Process Clause's prohibition
against vagueness.
10. Felony, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). The term felony is defined as "A
serious crime usu[ally] punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or by death."
11. 18 U.S.C. §924(e) (2006).
12. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N., 114TH CONG., REP. ON CAREER OFFENDER SENTENCING
ENHANCEMENTS, at 6 n.6.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 5-9. (the statute has changed over the years to include consideration of "number
and nature of prior convictions in an offender's background ... [and has also changed to] increase
sentences for certain kinds of offenses, such as drug trafficking, firearms and sex offenses").
15. See Cal. Penal Code § 667.71 (2006); see N.Y. Pen. Law §70.04(b) (1999).
16. Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Imposition ofEnhanced Sentence Under Recidivist
Statute as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 27 A.L.R. FED. 110 at § 2(a) (1976).
17. Id. (citations omitted).
18. Id. See also Lockyerv. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 77 (2003) (the Eighth Amendment based
"gross disproportionality principle reserves a constitutional violation for only the extraordinary
case. In applying this principle for § 2254(d)(1) purposes, it was not an unreasonable application
of our clearly established law for the California Court of Appeal to affirm Andrade's sentence of
two consecutive terms of 25 years to life in prison"); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30-31
(2003) ("[A] sentence of 25 years to life in prison, imposed for the offense of felony grand theft
under the three strikes law, is not grossly disproportionate and therefore does not violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.").
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II. Constitutional Vagueness and the Johnson Problem
The central holding of Johnson was that the so-called "residual
clause" 9 of the ACCA violated the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause
on grounds of vagueness.20 Before analyzing Johnson, however, this Note
will briefly review the vagueness doctrine and its origins.
A. A Brief History of the Vagueness Doctrine
Three-strike and other habitual offender laws are unconstitutionally
vague when they provide inadequate "notice" to persons that certain prior
convictions will result in a sentencing enhancement.2 ' The "notice"
requirement was first articulated in United States v. Reese, where the United
States Supreme Court struck down a federal statute prohibiting voting
discrimination because the statute's construction prohibited more than
authorized under the Fifteenth Amendment22 and further failed to adequately
distinguish between punishable crimes and crimes that are not punishable.23
The Court held the statute unconstitutional, highlighting issues of notice:
Penal statutes ought not to be expressed in language so uncertain. If
the legislature undertakes to define by statute a new offence, and
provide for its punishment, it should express its will in language that
need not deceive the common mind. Every man should be able to
24know with certainty when he is committing a crime.
The heightened consequences present in criminal, as opposed to civil,
cases impelled the Court to demand more specificity in the drafting
process.25 Int'l Harvester Co. of America v. Kentucky expanded upon the
"notice" requirement outlined in Reese.26 Int'l Harvester in many ways
foreshadows Johnson, not in judgment or facts, but in theory of analysis.27
19. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557. The Johnson Court explains the residual clause of the
ACCA required courts to analyze whether the typical commission of a crime "'involves conduct'
that presents too much risk of physical injury."
20. Id.at2558.
21. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
22. Id.at221-222.
23. Id. at 219 ("The law ought not to be in such a condition that the elector may act upon one
idea of its meaning, and the inspector upon another.").
24. Id. at 220.
25. Id.
26. Int'l Harvester Co. of America v. Com. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 216 (1914).
27. Compare Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557-58, with Int'7 Harvester Co. ofAmerica, 234 U.S.
at 223.
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In particular, the Int'l Harvester Court explained the dangers of requiring
purchasers to contemplate their actions in an imaginary or hypothetical world
as opposed to focusing on the real and present facts of a particular case:
[I]t shows how impossible it is to think away the principal facts of the
case as it exists and say what would have been the price in an
imaginary world.... The reason is not the general uncertainties of a
jury trial but that the elements necessary to determine the imaginary
ideal are uncertain both in nature and degree of effect to the acutest
commercial mind. . . . [A] criminal law is not unconstitutional merely
because it throws upon men the risk of rightly estimating a matter of
degree-what is an undue restraint of trade. That deals with the actual,
not with an imaginary condition other than the facts. . . . [T]o guess
. . . to divine prophetically what the reaction of only partially
determinate facts would be upon the imaginations and desires of
purchasers, is to exact gifts that mankind does not possess.28
If Reese was the progenitor of "lack of notice" as vagueness, Int'l
Harvester marked the start of a subspecies of the notice concept,29 namely,
"forcing citizens to gauge the criminality of their contemplated acts on a
hypothetical, rather than factual, predicate."30 The dangers highlighted in
Int'l Harvester foreshadowed the opinion in Johnson, which struck down a
statute requiring judges to imagine how crimes would be committed in the
"ordinary" or hypothetical sense as opposed to looking at the actual facts and
commission of the crime.3 ' Notice doctrine continued to evolve through case
law, and the emergence of a second approach began to take form in Connally
v. General Construction Co.3 2 The notice problem in Connally resulted from
28. Int'l Harvester Co. ofAmerica, 234 U.S. at 222-23 (citations omitted).
29. Id.
30. Evan Lee, Why California's Second-Degree Felony Murder Rule Is Now Void for
Vagueness, 43 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q., 1, 6 (2015).
31. Compare Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557-58, with Intl Harvester Co. ofAmerica, 234 U.S.
at 223 (The "categorical approach" (referred to hereinafter without quotation marks) applied in
Johnson focuses on a judicial inquiry into the "hypothetical" commission of a crime, whereas
International Harvester focused on the purchaser's hypothetical contemplation of the conduct
under question.).
32. In Johnson, Justice Scalia effectively merges the holdings of International Harvester and
Connally and explores the dangers of using a hypothetical or categorical approach when the crux
of the statutory analysis relies upon judicial interpretation of an ambiguous phrase. Moreover,
Johnson does not strike down the residual clause for its use of the "categorical approach," or even
simply because the language of the statute was unclear, but because the intersection of these two
factors created an overly ambiguous judicial determination.
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a compounding of ambiguities in the statute.33 The Connally court examined
an Oklahoma statute that "create[d] an eight-hour day for all persons
employed by or on behalf of the state [and provided the worker be paid] 'not
less than the current rate of per diem wages in the locality where the work
is performed."'3 4 The Court pointed to the interaction between the phrases
"current rate of wages" and "locality" to illustrate the compounding point:
The "current rate of wages" [includes] from so much (the minimum)
to so much (the maximum), [and] all between; and to direct the
payment of an amount which shall not be less than one of several
different amounts, without saying which, is to leave the question of
35what is meant incapable of any definite answer.
In the second place, additional obscurity is imparted to the statute by
the use of the qualifying word "locality." Who can say, with any
degree of accuracy, what areas constitute the locality where a given
piece of work is being done? . . . It is said State v. Tibbetts . . . [settled
the issue b]ut all the court did there was to define the word "locality"
as meaning "place," "near the place," "vicinity," or "neighborhood."
Accepting this as correct . . . the result is . . . to offer a choice of
uncertainties. The word "neighborhood" is quite as susceptible of
variation as the word "locality." Both terms are elastic and, dependent
upon circumstances.36
The vagueness problem outlined in Reese, Int'l Harvester, and Connally
provided the foundation for the Supreme Court's decision in Johnson.
B. The Vagueness Doctrine as Applied in Johnson
In Johnson, after years of unsuccessful attempts, Justice Scalia finally
persuaded enough of his colleagues that the ACCA residual clause was
hopelessly and unconstitutionally vague.37 The residual clause purported to
describe the last of several categories of convictions to be considered a
"violent felony" under the ACCA.38 In relevant part, the statute reads:
33. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 388 (1926).
34. Connally, 296 U.S. at 388 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 394.
36. Id. at 394-95 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
37. See generally Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
38. Id. at 2554.
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[T]he term "violent felony" means any crime punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, or any act of juvenile
delinquency involving the use or carrying of a firearm, knife, or
destructive device that would be punishable by imprisonment for such
term if committed by an adult, that
(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of
physical force against the person of another; or
(ii) is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or
otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of
physical injury to another.39
Under this provision, a conviction qualifies as a "violent felony" in one
of three ways: (1) if the crime is specifically enumerated as a "violent felony"
in the ACCA;o (2) if the elements of the underlying crime require the use
physical force in some way; or (3) if the crime falls into the catchall
provision (residual clause), which covers crimes whose elements necessarily
encompass conduct that "presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another."42
The residual clause, though convenient for prosecutors who could not
fit convictions into either of the first two definitions of "violent felony,"
provided defendants with little notice of which crimes would qualify for
enhancement.4 3 The Johnson Court stated that the "government violates [the
Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution] . . . by taking away
someone's life, liberty, or property under a criminal law so vague that it fails
to give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or [is] so
standard-less that it invites arbitrary enforcement."44 The Court's opinion,
cites to both Kolender and Connally to articulate the Fifth Amendment Due
Process problems with t e "catch-all provision," and states "the prohibition
of vagueness in criminal statutes 'is a well-recognized requirement,
consonant alike with ordinary notions of fair play and the settled rules of
law' . . . . [A] statute that flouts t[his] 'violates the first essential of due
process.'"'4  Thus, a statute that in effect fails to provide fundamental notice
39. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (emphasis added).
40. Id. ("is burglary, arson, or extortion").
41. Id. ("has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force").
42. Id.
43. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
44. Id. at 2556 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 103 S. Ct. 1855, 1858 (1983)).
45. Id. at 2557.
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to criminal defendants as to which crimes will qualify for enhancement, is
unconstitutionally vague.
It is important to note that Justice Scalia's majority opinion set forth
multiple factors for finding a statute unconstitutionally void for vagueness
under the Due Process Clause. In the case of the ACCA residual clause,
these factors tipped the balance from validity toward unconstitutionality.
Johnson identified the following factors as playing into its decision: (1)
"Grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a crime . . .
[because i]t ties the judicial assessment of risk to a judicially imagined
'ordinary case' of a crime, not to real-world facts or statutory elements"" in
conjunction with (2) the inconsistent and ambiguous nature of the words
"serious potential risk;" and (3) "the failure of 'persistent efforts . . . to
establish a standard' [which] can provide evidence of vagueness."4 7 Thus,
there are three principal factors in finding an anti-recidivism statute
unconstitutionally vague under Johnson. The first has to do with the
methodology employed by courts in interpreting the underlying convictions.
With respect to the ACCA residual clause, courts were interpreting the
underlying convictions in a "categorical" manner, which is to say, based on
hypothetical facts rather than on the actual facts of the crimes committed by
the offender. The second factor has to do with the anti-recidivist statute's
textual scope defining which convictions "qualify" for sentencing
enhancement. With the ACCA residual clause, "serious potential risk" was
too open-ended to provide predictability or notice. The third factor concerns
courts' track records in interpreting the scope of the anti-recidivist statute in
question. With the ACCA residual clause, the Supreme Court itself had
decided four cases in a relatively short period of time-James, Chambers,
Begay, and Sykes-and still felt it needed to grant certiorari in Johnson to
clarify the scope of the clause.8 Justice Scalia's reasoned arguments
ultimately convinced his colleagues that they were never going to succeed.
1. The Categorical Approach and Johnson
Justice Scalia's rationale for striking the ACCA residual clause as
unconstitutionally vague began with a discussion of the categorical
approach. The vagueness problem in Johnson stemmed from the application
46. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557.
47. Id. at 2558 (quoting United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81, 91 (1921)).
48. See generally James v. United States, 550 U.S. 192, 208 (2007); Begay v. United States,
553 U.S. 137, 144-145 (2008); Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122, 128-129 (2009); Sykes
v. United States, 564 U.S. 1, 10 (2011).
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of a pure4 9 categorical approach, a test derived (in the criminal context, at
least) from an earlier Supreme Court case, Taylor v. United States.o In
Taylor, the Supreme Court adopted a type of categorical approach' when
determining if a prior burglary conviction qualified as burglary under the
burglary clause of the ACCA.52 The categorical approach used in Taylor has
been labeled by some courts as a "'least culpable conduct test'5 3 in the sense
that it 'look[s] to the elements of the statutory state offense, not to the
specific facts,' reading the applicable statute to ascertain the least culpable
conduct necessary to sustain conviction under the statute."5 4  The Taylor
analysis requires judges to compare the elements of the underlying offense
with a listed or qualifying offense under the enhancing statute. Where a
statute has no list of qualifying felonies, courts must conduct an analytically
distinct kind of categorical approach. The distinct categorical analysis used
in the ACCA residual clause cases, instead imagines a set of facts that could
49. The "pure" categorical approach is an approach that does not allow judges to consult the
underlying facts of an individual's case during the sentencing enhancement stage. See Descamps
v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276, 2287 (2013) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575,
601(1990) and Nijhawan v. Holder, 557 U.S. 29, 36 (2009)) ("'Congress intended the sentencing
court to look only to the fact that the defendant had been convicted of crimes falling within certain
categories, and not to the facts underlying the prior convictions .. . other statutes require[d] a ...
circumstance-specific,' not a 'categorical,' . . . approach").
50. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (referencing Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600).
51. Jennifer Lee Koh, Crimmigration and the Void for Vaguness Doctrine, 6 WISC. L. REV.
1127, 1147 (2016) (emphasis added). There are two types of categorical approaches. The first type
of categorical approach was defined in Taylor v. United States and will be explained more fully in
the text of this Note. The second test is similar to the first, and differs only in that it lacks the aid
of a "generic definition" or defined elements to assist in the analysis. The second type of categorical
approach is defined as follows: "In the absence of a limited set of elements ascertainable through
the naming of a generic crime in the residual clause, courts developed a unique variation on the
'categorical approach.' Under the so-called 'ordinary case approach' established by the Supreme
Court in a 2007 case, James v. United States . . . 'the proper inquiry is whether the conduct
encompassed by the elements of the offense, in the ordinary case, presents a serious potential risk
of injury to another.' The James Court provided only rough guidance on how courts should identify
this mythical 'ordinary case."'
52. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.
53. The term "least culpable conduct" is used in some cases to explain the categorical analysis
envisioned by Taylor. See generally Jean-Louis v. Attorney General of United States, 582 F.3d
462, 465-66 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Wilsonv. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 377, 381 (3d Cir.2003)); United
States v. Harris, 844 F.3d 1260, 1268 n.9 (10th Cir. 2017) (referencing the analysis required by
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290-91 (2013)). The term "least culpable conduct" has also been referred
to as the "minimum conduct" test. See Lee, supra note 29, at 12. The term "least culpable conduct"
has also been referred to as an "elements-based" test. See Koh, supra note 50, at 1170 n.279.
54. Jean-Louis, 582 F.3d at 465-66 (citing Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 89 (3d Cir.
2004)) (and quoting Wilson, 350 F.3d at 381)).
55. Taylor, 495 U.S. at 601.
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be characterized as the "ordinary" or "typical" commission of a crime.56
Courts must then ask whether that imagined set of facts falls within the
essential elements of the underlying statute of conviction. Although the least
culpable conduct and typical commission types of categorical analysis differ,
they share one critical attribute relevant to the vagueness doctrine: they both
rely heavily on the unforeseeable imaginings of judges.
Courts could not use the Taylor least culpable conduct categorical
approach in examining the residual clause because the clause provided no
list of qualifying felonies to compare the elements of offenses. Instead,
judges relied on the ordinary commission version of the categorical approach
used in James, which required judges to "picture the kind of conduct that the
crime involve[d] in 'the ordinary case,' and [to decide] whether that
abstraction present[ed] a serious potential risk of physical injury 5" absent
any neatly defined elements of an offense when making theirjudgment.5 9 As
with any form of categorical analysis, the ordinary commission approach
does not look at the actual facts underlying the defendant's convictions but
instead imagines the facts of the ordinary or typical commission of the
statutory code provision under which the defendant has been convicted.60
The categorical approach of convictions, as opposed to looking at the actual
facts underlying a conviction, always requires some judicial hypothesizing,
but as Justice Scalia explained, combining this level of abstraction with an
already vague statute ("serious potential risk of injury") provided too little
notice.6i The Supreme Court in Johnson cited a Connecticut offense,
"rioting at a correctional institution," to explain the difficulties in the levels
62
of judicial imagining required by the vague residual clause.
Specifically, the Court explained the Connecticut statute "'rioting at a
correctional institution' . . .certainly sounds like a violent felony-until one
realizes that Connecticut defines this offense to include taking part in 'any
disorder, disturbance, strike, riot or other organized disobedience to the rules
56. See Koh, supra note 50.
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
58. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557 (citing James, 550 U.S. at 208).
59. For posterity sake, this Note will explain both the James-type categorical approach and
the Taylor-variety "categorical approach." But this Note will also explain that, while Johnson 's
holding specifically applies to the James approach, this Note will show that either the James or the
Taylor approach can lead to vagueness issues under Johnson.
60. James, 550 U.S. at 202, 208.
61. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2556-58.
62. Id. at 2560 (citing United States v. Johnson, 616 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2010) (Parker, J.,
dissenting)).
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and regulations' of the prison."63  As the Supreme Court in Johnson
continued to question "[w]ho is to say which the ordinary 'disorder' most
closely resembles-a full-fledged prison riot, a food-fight in the prison
cafeteria, or a 'passive and nonviolent [act] such as disregarding an order to
move?' 6 4 The Connecticut statute provided the anecdote by which Justice
Scalia explained the arbitrary level of abstraction and judicial imagining
required by a categorical analysis. Justice Scalia's explanation of the
aforementioned inquiry reinforced the Court's holding in Johnson, because
the rationale for striking down the residual clause of the ACCA rested
critically on the problematic intersection of the abstraction required by the
categorical approach and the ambiguities in the ACCA statute:
Two features of the residual clause conspire to make it
unconstitutionally vague. In the first place, the residual clause
leaves grave uncertainty about how to estimate the risk posed by a
crime ....
At the same time, the residual clause leaves uncertainty about how
much risk it takes for a crime to qualify as a violent felony. It is one
thing to apply an imprecise "serious potential risk" standard to real
world facts; it is quite another to apply it to a judge imagined
abstraction. By asking whether the crime "otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk . . . ."
By combining indeterminacy about how to measure the risk posed
by a crime with indeterminacy about how much risk it takes for the
crime to qualify as a violent felony, the residual clause produces
more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process
Clause tolerates.
Justice Scalia argued not that the phrase "serious risk" was alone
impermissibly vague, but, that requiring a judge to determine what
constitutes an "ordinary" commission of a given offense, while
simultaneously asking a judge to determine how much risk is "serious," and
63. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560.
64. Id.
65. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557-58 (citations omitted).
66. See Lee, supra note 29, at 14; and Koh, supra note 50, at 1149-50.
Fall 2017] 197
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
then applying the two findings to each other, results in an impermissibly
vague and arbitrary judicial determination.6 7
2. Demonstrated Judicial Inability to Establish a Workable Standard
Justice Scalia's second rationale for striking down the residual clause
relied on a review of the Supreme Court's own fruitless history of trying to
establish a clear and consistent standard for determining which crimes fell
within the residual clause.6 " The review began with James v. United States,
which involved a Florida attempted burglary statute. The issue was whether
"'the risk posed by attempted burglary is comparable to that posed by its
closest analog among the enumerated offenses,' namely completed burglary;
we concluded that it was."6 9 This settled once and for all whether attempted
burglary in Florida fell within the ACCA residual clause but provided no
help in determining which other crimes fell within the residual clause.70 It
did not even settle whether attempted burglary in other states qualified, given
that each state has its own definitions of both burglary and attempt.
Next up was the New Mexico drunk driving statute presented in Begay
v. UnitedStates.7 ' Realizing that it needed to start giving guidance to lower
courts by setting forth some general principles about which crimes
qualified under the residual clause, the Court propounded a new limit,
namely that the residual clause only applies to crimes that typically involve
"'purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct."'7 2  Applying this new
standard to the New Mexico DUI statute, the Court found "drunk driving
insufficiently similar to the listed crimes [in the ACCA], because it
typically does not involve 'purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct."'73
The Begay court departed from James's, "h[olding] that in order to qualify
as a violent felony under the residual clause, a crime must resemble the
[ACCA] enumerated offenses 'in kind as well as in degree of risk
posed. "' However, as the Court would later admit, the holding in Begay
was ultimately unsuccessful in providing clarity to the residual clause
67. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557-58; see also Lee, supra note 29, at 14; and Koh, supra note
50, at 1149-50.
68. Id. at 2560.
69. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558 (quotingJames, 550 U.S. at 203).
70. Id.
71. See generally Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008).
72. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2559 (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 144-45).
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Begay, 553 U.S. at 143).
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analysis because "it did not (and could not) eliminate the need to imagine
the kind of conduct typically involved in a crime."
The very next term, continuing its quest to impart predictability to the
residual clause, the Court granted review in Chambers v. United States,
involving an Illinois statute criminalizing the failure to report to a penal
institution. Justice Breyer's majority opinion accentuated the importance
of statistics in determining whether particular offenses presented "a serious
potential risk of physical injury." Chambers "relied principally on a
statistical report prepared by the Sentencing Commission to conclude that an
offender who fails to report to prison is not 'significantly more likely than
others to attack, or physically to resist, an apprehender, thereby producing a
'serious potential risk of physical injury.'"7  Clearly, Justice Breyer believed
that empirical data held promise as a way of sorting which crimes fell within
and outside the residual clause. Dissenting, Justice Scalia rejected statistics
as a guide for two reasons.7 9 First, although a study happened to be available
and applicable to the statute in Chambers, the Court would still be left
without a consistent standard for "the tens of thousands of federal and state
crimes for which no comparable reports exist."o Second, even where studies
exist, "those studies . . . available might suffer from methodological flaws,
be skewed toward rarer forms of the crime, or paint widely divergent pictures
of the riskiness of the conduct that the crime involves."8i
Only two years later, the Court again granted certiorari to review a
mandatory minimum sentence under the residual clause.8 2 Sykes v. United
States involved an Indiana statute making it a crime to use a motor vehicle
to flee a police officer.83 Holding that such a crime did present a "serious
potential risk of physical injury," the Court cited statistics from many sources
to make the empirical case.4  Yet Justice Kennedy's majority opinion
seemed to step back from the Court's position in Chambers that statistics
75. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2559.
76. See generally Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009).
77. Id. at 128-29.
78. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558-59 (quoting Chambers, 555 U.S. at 128-29).
79. Id. at 2559.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See generally Sykes v. United States, 564 U.S. 1 (2011).
83. Id.
84. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2559 (citing Sykes, 564 U.S. at 2274, 2289-90).
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were the main factor.15  Statistics were only relevant "[to] confirm the
commonsense conclusion that Indiana's vehicular flight crime is a violent
felony.", 6 Kennedy and the majority simply found it hard to believe that the
typical case of vehicular flight from a police officer isn't very dangerous.7 In
terms of setting a precedent hat would give everyone sufficient notice of what
falls within the residual clause, however, Sykes did little. Its nuanced use of
statistics and common sense was too specific to vehicular flight from a police
officer; whether other types of crimes presented a sufficient amount of risk
would continue to have to be gauged on a crime-by-crime basis." This would
lead to the Court granting certiorari in Johnson four years later to once again
try to give the residual clause a determinate and predictable meaning.89
Johnson presented the issue of whether the Minnesota statute punishing
unlawful possession of a short-barreled shotgun fell within the residual
clause.90 The Court refused to answer that question, instead striking down
the residual clause altogether for vagueness.91 One important factor behind
the Court's decision was its own demonstrated inability (in James, Begay,
Chambers, and Sykes) to create a working standard for analysis:
This Court has acknowledged that the failure of "persistent efforts ...
to establish a standard" can provide evidence of vagueness . . .
repeated attempts and repeated failures to craft a principled and
objective standard out of the residual clause confirm its hopeless
indeterminacy....
85. See Sykes, 564 U.S. at 10 ("Although statistics are not dispositive, here they confirm the
commonsense conclusion that Indiana's vehicular flight crime is a violent felony. See Chambers,
555 U.S. at 129 ... (explaining that statistical evidence sometimes 'helps provide a conclusive ...
answer' concerning the risks that crimes present.")).
86. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2559 (quoting Sykes, 564 U.S. at 10).
87. Sykes, 564 U.S. at 10 (stating "the commonsense conclusion that Indiana's vehicular
flight crime is a violent felony.").
88. See Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558-59 (The court critiqued the reliance of statistics and also
stated, "Common sense has not even produced a consistent conception of the degree of risk posed
by each of the four enumerated crimes; there is no reason to expect it to fare any better with respect
to thousands of unenumerated crimes. All in all, James, Chambers, and Sykes failed to establish
any generally applicable test that prevents the risk comparison required by the residual clause from
devolving into guesswork and intuition.").
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It has been said that the life of the law is experience. Nine years'
experience trying to derive meaning from the residual clause
92convinces us that we have embarked upon a failed enterprise.
Thus, Johnson mandates a finding of vagueness where the categorical
approach intersects with an ambiguously worded statute, and where persistent
judicial efforts to provide a clear and consistent standard have failed.
III. Texas and the Johnson Problem
Although Johnson deals specifically with a federal three-strikes law,
Johnson is equally applicable to state career-or habitual-offender laws
that similarly fail to provide adequate notice, or consistency in judgment for
criminal defendants.93 This is because the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause is incorporated within the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore applies equally against the states.9 4 This section
demonstrates that the vagueness doctrine, particularly as explicated by
Johnson, invalidates the state habitual offender foreign jurisdiction clause in
Texas Penal Code Section 12.42.
As explored previously, a Johnson issue can only occur where courts
apply a pure categorical approach. Thus this analysis will begin by
reinforcing what makes a pure categorical approach and also will argue that
Texas courts apply a pure Taylor-variety least culpable conduct categorical
approach to the Texas habitual offender statute. After establishing that Texas
courts in fact apply a Taylor-variety approach and therefore in fact engage
in a level of "judicial imagining," this Note argues that the application of this
approach raises vagueness issues when combined with Texas' ambiguously
worded foreign jurisdiction clause. In particular, this Note explains that
92. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560; see also Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558-60 (quoting Chambers,
555 U.S. at 133) ("The clause has 'created numerous splits among the lower federal courts,' where
it has proved 'nearly impossible to apply consistently."').
93. The holding in Johnson, and the vagueness doctrine in general, derives from the
Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, which
applies to states, is incorporated within the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. States
must therefore similarly enact laws that do not flout the underlying constitutional protections
afforded to all individuals. And although Johnson struck down a federal habitual offender
sentencing scheme, the holding is also relevant to a protection of due process rights of individuals
facing state induced criminal sentencing enhancement.
94. See generally Hurtado v. People of State of Cal., 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884) (holding
"the natural and obvious inference is that, in the sense of the constitution, 'due process of law' was
not meant or intended to include, ex vi termini, the institution and procedure of a grand jury in any
case. The conclusion is equally irresistible, that when the same phrase was employed in the
Fourteenth Amendment to restrain the action of the states, it was used in the same sense and with
no greater extent.").
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because Texas' foreign jurisdiction clause uses ambiguous and often
confusing language, the intersection of that open-ended language with the
judicial imaginings inherent in the least culpable conduct approach, denies
criminal offenders constitutionally sufficient notice of which prior
convictions will enhance their sentences. Finally, this Note argues just as
the United States Supreme Court struggled to give a clear meaning to the
ACCA residual clause, the Texas courts have repeatedly encountered
difficulty in crafting a clear and consistent est for applying the least culpable
conduct test o the foreign jurisdiction clause of the habitual offender statute.
This analysis argues the Texas courts' failure to establish a clear and consistent
standard of application constitutes a second independent ground for finding
the foreign jurisdiction clause unconstitutionally vague under Johnson.
A. The Categorical Approach and Texas Penal Code §12.42
Under the Texas "habitual offender" statute-Texas Penal Code section
12.42-criminal offenders receive sentencing enhancement for "foreign
convictions" (offenses committed outside of Texas) if the conviction
"contain[s] elements that are substantially similar to the elements of a
[qualifying Texas] offense."95 To aid the inquiry, Texas' habitual offender
statute provides an exhaustive list of all crimes under Texas law that qualify
offenders for enhancement.9 6  However, because this list only includes
crimes committed in Texas,97 judges must consider whether the elements of
the out-of-state crime committed could similarly have qualified the criminal
defendant for conviction under one of the enumerated Texas crimes.98 And,
because state criminal laws differ from state to state, the elements
constituting a given crime may be vastly different in one state than another.
This phenomenon creates the precise problem the United States Supreme
Court faced in Taylor.99 For example, the elements required for a conviction
of "burglary" in California may not qualify as a "burglary" in Texas.00
Unless the Texas legislature wanted to exempt all non-Texas convictions
from qualifying under its habitual offender statute, the legislature had to
95. Tex. Penal Code § 12.42 (c)(2)(B)(v) (emphasis added). Most state three-strike statutes
contain a similar provision, but most of those provisions are interpreted by their respective state




99. See generally Taylorv. United States, 495 U.S. 575 (1990).
100. Id.
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provide some method of determining which foreign (non-Texas) convictions
qualified and which did not.
We have now seen that the foreign jurisdiction clause draws the border
between qualifying and non-qualifying foreign convictions by asking
whether elements of the crime are "substantially similar" to the elements of
a Texas offense that qualifies for enhancement.'0' Because the statute
compares the "elements" of a crime, the Texas courts could not use a factual
approach to determine which foreign convictions are "substantially similar"
to qualifying Texas convictions.10 2 The Texas courts could not examine facts
underlying the foreign conviction to determine whether the defendant's
actual conduct would have constituted a crime under an analogous Texas
criminal statute.103 They had no choice but to adopt an approach tethered to
the elements of offenses, which required some kind of categorical approach.
Texas courts adopted the pure categorical approach (least culpable
conduct approach) in White v. State.04 The White court explained: "for
enhancement purposes, section 12.42(c)(2)(B)(v) requires only that a
defendant's prior conviction . . . contain 'elements that are substantially
similar to the elements of an offense' . . . [t]he statute does not require that
the facts and circumstances of the out-of-state offense be substantially
similar."' The "substantially similar" inquiry requires a judge to compare
the statute of conviction against the generic definition of the enhancing
Texas offense.'0 6  This inquiry mirrors the Taylor least culpable conduct
categorical approach in the following ways: (1) Taylor's approach, like the
Texas approach, focuses on a comparison between elements of the offenses,
not the underlyingfacts of an offender's case,0 7 and (2) the Taylor approach,
like the Texas approach, questions whether the elements of the statute of
conviction sufficiently mirror the elements of the generic definition of the
offense.08 The White analysis excludes the Taylor focus on hypothetical
imaginations of the least culpable conduct. However, more recent Texas
decisions have implemented judicial imaginations required for an analysis to
receive classification as a least culpable conduct inquiry.
101. See Tex. Penal Code § 12.42 (c)(2)(B)(v).
102. Tex. Penal Code § 12.42 (c)(2)(B)(v).
103. See Prudholmv. State, 333 S.W.3d 590, 592 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
104. See generally White v. State, 2003 WL 865351 (Tex. App. Mar. 6, 2003).
105. Id. at *3.
106. See Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 596-600.
107. Compare White, 2003 WL 865351 at *3, with Taylor, 495 U.S. at 600.
108. Id.
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For example, in 2013, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Anderson
v. State reaffirmed White's explanation of the analysis required in foreign
jurisdiction clause cases, and in many ways applied an analysis that more
closely mirrors the Taylor-variety categorical approach. The Anderson court
compared the elements in North Carolina's taking indecent liberties with
children statute with the elements in Texas' "indecency with a child"
statute.109 The Anderson court found North Carolina's taking indecent
liberties with children statute to be insufficiently similar to Texas' indecency
with a child statute."0 The Anderson court's analysis focused on the
different ranges of conduct punishable under either statute:
The crucial difference is that under the North Carolina statute, almost
any conduct . .. may satisfy the "bad act" element of the offense ....
For example, North Carolina defendants have been convicted of
"Indecent Liberties" for kissing a minor's face, French kissing a
minor, and hugging the legs of a minor. Such conduct would clearly
be insufficient to meet the elements of our Texas "Indecency with a
Child" statute . . . . While the elements of two offenses need not
"parallel" one another to be "substantially similar," they must
criminalize a similar "range of conduct." The North Carolina statute
criminalizes a great range of conduct that is lawful in Texas [and is
thus broader then the Texas statute]."
The quote above exemplifies the Anderson court's use of the pure,
Taylor-variety categorical approach12 in a few distinct ways. First, the
Anderson court illustrates its use of a Taylor-variety approach by explaining
the following conduct-"kissing a minor's face, french kissing a minor, and
hugging the legs of a minor""1-is less culpable than conduct punishable
under the Texas statute."4 The conduct cited by the Anderson court arguably
represents some of the least egregious conduct, or least culpable conduct,
109. Andersonv. State, 394 S.W.3d 531, 533, 539 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
110. Id. at 533.
111. Anderson, 394 S.W.3d at 538-539 (citations omitted).
112. However, it is essential under Johnson that Texas courts use some variation of a pure
categorical analysis-not that Texas courts necessarily perfectly follow either the Taylor-variety
categorical approach or the James-type categorical approach. See generally Koh, supra note 50, at
1168-69 (explaining any pure "categorical approach," when combined with an overly vague
statute, can raise issues of vagueness under Johnson).
113. Anderson, 394 S.W.3d at 538-39.
114. Id. at 539.
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punishable under the North Carolina statute."5  By emphasizing this
conduct, the Anderson court demonstrates its use of the least culpable
conduct piece of the Taylor analysis. The court continues to reinforce its use
of a Taylor-variety approach by focusing on statutory elements, as opposed
to the underlying facts,"6 of the offender's conviction." 7 But what is most
demonstrative of Anderson 's use of a least culpable conduct approach is
the court's judicial imagining of what conduct would qualify under the
Texas statute.
As with a Taylor-variety least culpable conduct categorical approach,
the Anderson court considered conduct that would qualify offenders for
conviction under North Carolina's statute, and then considered whether this
conduct would qualify under the Texas statute."" Notably, the Anderson
court cites ranges of conduct historically punished under the North Carolina
statute, but the Anderson court did not explain or include the factual
scenarios underpinning the conduct. 119 Rather, the Anderson court explained
generally that "kissing a minors face, french kissing, and hugging the legs of
a minor" constituted conduct that could not satisfy the Texas statute, "even
if [the court imagined the conduct was] performed to 'arouse or gratify ...
115. The North Carolina statute punishes offenders who "commit any lewd or lascivious act
upon or with the body or any part or member of the body of any child of either sex under the age
of 16 years." Id. at 537 n.27 (quoting N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-202.1). The language in the statute,
particularly the "lewd" and "lascivious" language, could be broadly construed to encompass
markedly more egregious acts than the conduct cited by the Anderson court.
116. Texas courts addressing the use of facts in sentencing effectively allow only a "modified
categorical approach." A full treatment of the modified categorical approach is not necessary for
this Note, but is relevant only insofar as it reinforces Texas courts' use of a pure categorical
approach as opposed to a circumstance-specific approach. The modified categorical approach
allows a court to look at limited class documents "to determine which alternative element formed
the basis of the defendant's prior conviction," but not to determine whether the factual crime falls
within the generic definition of an offense. Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2278, 2279
(2013). The modified categorical approach "is consistent with a strong elements-based categorical
approach." Koh, supra note 50, at 1170 n.279. Texas courts have similarly applied a modified
categorical approach in a limited number of cases, which merely reinforces the use of a pure
categorical approach. See Castle v. State, 402 S.W.3d 895, 908 (Tex. App. 2013, no pet) (the court
used limited documents to determine the age of a victim in a statutory rape case. This demonstrates
the modified categorical approach because the facts here were used to determine whether the
offender was convicted for an alternative age element that was more broadly construed than what
was required for the enhancing offense. The court noted "while generally we do not focus on the
specific conduct alleged, but rather on the elements of the offense, 'sometimes, the specific conduct,
as well as the elements, must be considered."'); Anderson, 394 S.W.3d at 536 n.21 (citing Texas
Dep't of Public Safety v. Garcia, 327 S.W.3d 898, 906-07 (Tex. App. 2010, pet denied)).
117. Anderson, 394 S.W.3d at 536.
118. Compare Anderson, 394 S.W.3d at 538-39, with Taylorv. United States, 495 U.S. 575,
599-601, 602-603 (1990).
119. Anderson, 394 S.W.3d at 538-39.
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sexual desire.""120 This reinforces the notion that Texas courts were not
applying the actual fact patterns from North Carolina cases to the Texas
statute. Rather, the Anderson court hypothetically considered ranges of
conduct that could qualify offenders for enhancement under North
Carolina's statute and then imagined whether these hypothetical scenarios
would be punishable under the Texas statute.121
This hypothetical judicial imagining mirrors the type of analysis often
used by courts applying the Taylor-variety categorical approach.12 2 More
importantly, Anderson 's analysis, combined with recent case law relying on
this analysis,23 reinforces Texas' requirement of a least culpable conduct
categorical approach in sentencing enhancement under Texas Penal Code
section 12.42.
Recall, however, that Johnson did not involve the least culpable
conduct test; it dealt with the ordinary or typical commission approach that
had been applied to the ACCA residual clause.12 4  This may lead to the
conclusion that Johnson 's holding is relevant only when courts use a James-
type ordinary commission categorical approach. However, as scholar
Jennifer Lee Koh explains, Johnson 's holding merely suggests that the
Taylor least culpable conduct approach poses comparatively less vagueness
danger than the ordinary commission James approach. 125 According to Koh,
"[E]very time Johnson referenced the prohibition on consulting 'real-world
facts' . . . it also emphasized the absence of 'statutory elements' in the
analysis ... [for example] in James v. United States ... the Court highlighted
'how speculative [and how detached from statutory elements] this enterprise
120. Anderson, 394 S.W.3d at 538-39.
121. Id. at 539.
122. See Aatter ofSilva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (2008) (The court states that it must
apply a Taylor-variety categorical approach. The courts analysis used judicially imagined
hypothetical scenarios to determine whether the statute of conviction would qualify an offender for
enhancement under the enhancing statute.).
123. The following cases use the same analysis adopted in Anderson. See generally Wagner
v. State, 2009 WL 838187, at *15 (Tex. App. Nov. 18, 2009); Prudholmv. State, 274 S.W.3d 236
(Tex. App. 2008) aff'd, 333 S.W.3d 590 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Outlandv. State, 389 S.W.3d 346
(2012); Anderson v. State, 394 S.W.3d 531, 535-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Lott v. State, 2016
WL 1298962 (Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2016), reh g overruled (May 11, 2016), petition for discretionary
review refused (Aug. 24, 2016).
124. See generally Johnsonv. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
125. See Koh, supra note 50, at 1168-69 (arguing "Johnson, as well the broader case law
addressing the categorical approach, clarifies that the problem in Johnson lies with the peculiar
variation of the categorical approach the 'ordinary case' analysis-adopted by courts when
interpreting the residual clause of the ACCA and similar provisions . . . . In other words, a
categorical approach that relies strictly on statutory elements is less likely to run afoul of the
vagueness doctrine.").
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has become."'"26 But while Koh recognizes the elements-based approach
poses less vagueness danger than the James ordinary commission approach,
she, and others,127 ultimately argue that even a strict elements-based
categorical approach is not exempt from vagueness challenges. Koh
explains that "despite the overall workability of a strong 'categorical
approach,' which minimizes fact-finding, statutes (and statutory
constructions) exist such that the application of the 'categorical approach'
may still result in indeterminacy. In those cases, courts should invoke the
vagueness doctrine." 28  Koh continues to highlight instances where an
elements-based categorical approach may be suspect under Johnson:
[Koh's] Article does not advocate applying vagueness to those
statutes in which an elements-based categorical approach produces
relatively uniform results . . . [but at times there are] statutes for
which the categorical approach does not yield clarity or consistency
in the courts . . . . Measuring consistency is . . . a potentially elusive
process. But evaluating the degree to which lower courts are split
on assessing . . . consequences of particular crimes may provide an
initial data point for doing so. In cases where courts seem unable to
achieve consensus over time . . . courts should consider whether the
problem lies in the statute's vagueness.129
Koh explains that Johnson 's holding can extend to an elements-based
categorical approach if that approach is applied to an overly ambiguous
statute and if courts applying the approach to the statute are consistently
unable to create a clear judicial standard.3 0 Looking at how some courts
apply the Taylor-variety least culpable conduct categorical approach not
only justifies Koh's interpretation of Johnson, but also provides an
independent justification for applying Johnson to courts using a Taylor
approach.
As Justice Scalia explains in Johnson, the vagueness problem arose in
part due to judicial imaginings that were inevitable under an ordinary case
126. Koh, supra note 50, at 1169 (quoting Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558).
127. See Armed Career CriminalAct Residual Clause Johnson v. United States, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 301, 309-10 (2015) ("Justice Scalia ... significantly revived and broadened the vagueness
doctrine, indicating that where a statute was mostly vague, but perhaps clearly covered a core of
conduct, it could still be violative of a defendant's due process rights and therefore void.").
128. See Koh, supra note 50, at 1133.
129. See Koh, supra note 50, at 1170-71 (citations omitted).
130. Id.
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categorical approach.13' But judicial imaginings are not unique to the
ordinary case categorical approach and are equally present in the least
culpable conduct categorical approach. A prime example of judicial
imagining in the least culpable conduct categorical approach is presented in
Matter ofSilva-Trevino.
Matter of Silva-Trevino analyzed whether Texas Penal Code section
21.11(a)(1) constituted a "crime involving moral turpitude" under a federal
enhancing statute.132 The court explained that the analysis required a Taylor-
variety least culpable conduct categorical approach.13 3 Using this approach,
the court provided the following analysis:
In contrast to statutory rape ... which typically involves penetration
or something similar, the sexual conduct encompassed by [the Texas
Penal Code] . . . potentially involves much less intrusive contact. For
example, a defendant in Texas has been convicted under the statute for
touching the chest/breast of a 10-year-old boy . . . . This raises the
possibility that a 20-year-old woman dancing suggestively with a
youth just under the age of 17, who represents himself as older and
can reasonably be believed to be such, could be liable under the statute
if she acted on a desire to arouse herself or a spectator. This is so even
if she touched the victim through his clothing. This does not strike us
as the type of behavior which would be classified as involving moral
turpitude under the Act. 134
The Matter of Silva-Trevino court's analysis demonstrates the latitude
afforded to judges-under even the least culpable conduct categorical
approach-to subjectively imagine any range of conduct to justify a
decision. 135 Ultimately, an analysis that fails to rely on the underlying case
facts will inevitably produce imagined scenarios. And as Johnson held,
combining an open-ended statute with a judicially imagined categorical
analysis "produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due
Process Clause tolerates."l36 Texas Penal Code section 12.42 may be subject
to a Johnson vagueness challenge for two reasons: (1) the least culpable
conduct categorical approach requires the same type of judicially imagined
131. Johnsonv. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557-58 (2015).
132. Aatter of Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688 (2008) (citing §212(a)(2) of 8 U.S.C.
§1182(a)(2) (2006)).
133. See generally Aatter ofSilva-Trevino, 24 1. & N. Dec. 687 (2008).
134. Id. at 692.
135. Id.
136. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558.
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factual scenario questioned in Johnson, and (2) Texas Penal Code section
12.42 requires some type of least culpable conduct categorical approach.
B. Ambiguous Language in Texas Penal Code §12.42
Under Johnson, a law is vague if it applies a pure categorical approach
to an ambiguously worded statute, and if there is a history of futile judicial
efforts to clarify the statute's meaning.137 Because Texas courts apply a
categorical approach to an ambiguously worded clause in Texas Penal Code
section 12.42, and because these courts have struggled unsuccessfully to give
determinate meaning to the statute's ambiguous clause, the statute is
unconstitutionally vague.
The term "substantially similar" has been defined in varying ways
throughout Texas case law. The Texas Court of Appeals first attempted to
define substantially similar in the 2008 case Prudholm v. State.138  In
Prudholm, the court analyzed whether "California['s] sexual battery offense
addresses less offensive conduct [than] . . . the Texas sexual assault
offense." 39 Prudholm held "the elements of another state's law [are]
substantially similar to the elements of an offense listed in section
12.42(c)(2)(B)(i)-(iv) when the elements of the other [s]tate's law parallel
the elements of a single Texas offense."o4 0 The court failed to explain how
to interpret "parallel" and how the "parallel" language clarifies "substantially
similar." As a result, the Prudholm court, on a successive appeal, revisited
the issues presented in the district court.'4  The Prudholn court struggled
again to define "substantially similar," and also rejected the "parallel" test
stating "we have found no legal authority for this 'parallel' test, and it seems
,,142of little assistance in applying the statute. The court replaced this test
with the following:
[If] an element of the foreign offense can be proved by a fact that
would be insufficient to prove the respective Texas element, the
elements may still be substantially similar ....
"[S]ubstantial" means "to a large extent" while "similar" means
"having a likeness or resemblance." Together with comparative words
137. See generally Johnsonv. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
138. See Prudholmv. State, 274 S.W.3d 236, 239-40 (Tex. App. 2008).
139. Id. at 241.
140. Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
141. Prudholmv. State, 333 S.W.3d 590, 593-96 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
142. Id. at 596.
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like "similar," "majority," or "probability," the combination with
"substantial" or "substantially" means something significantly greater
than the modified word, whereas with absolute words like "complete,"
"certain," or "all," the combination with "substantially" means
something only slightly less than the modified word ("similar").
Based on this common usage, we hold that the elements being
compared pursuant to Penal Code Section 12.42(c)(2)(B)(v) must
display a high degree of likeness, but may be less than identical.143
The above description exemplifies the difficulty in defining
"substantially similar," and amplifies the ambiguity in the phrase. As will
be discussed more fully in the next section, the appellate court's description
of "substantially similar," and subsequent est for determining "substantial
similarity," have not reduced the confusion surrounding the phrase. 4 4 The
difficulty in defining "substantially similar" is compounded by additional
difficulty in measuring "similarity." 4 5 The Prudholm court recognized this
difficulty in defining as well as quantifying "substantial similarity," stating
the phrase still begs the "critical question of the respect in which the elements
must display a high degree oflikeness ... elements ... could be substantially
similar with respect to general characteristics such as terminology, function,
and type of element, or with respect to specific characteristics such as the
seriousness of violent or sexual aspects."4  The apparent difficulty in
measuring and defining "substantial similarity" raises an additional
justification for finding Texas Penal Code section 12.42 unconstitutional
under Johnson.
In Johnson, the Court held "[b]y combining indeterminacy about how
to measure the risk posed by a crime with indeterminacy about how much
risk it takes for the crime to qualify as a violent felony, the residual clause
produces more unpredictability and arbitrariness than the Due Process
Clause tolerates." This combines confusion in measuring the risk with a
difficulty in defining the quantum of risk required to satisfy the statute's
definition.14 The problems with "substantially similar" are analogous to the
143. Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d. at 594 (emphasis added).
144. See Andersonv. State, 394 S.W.3d 531, 535-37 (2013).
145. Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 594-95.
146. Id. at 594 (emphasis added).
147. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558 (emphasis added).
148. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2558 (emphasis added).
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issues identified with the ACCA residual clause.14 9  Namely, the
"substantially similar" clause raises confusion regarding the method of
defining substantial similarity,5 o and the degree of similarity required to
qualify as "substantially similar."'' Thus, the foreign jurisdiction clause
presents the same combination of ambiguities present in the ACCA residual
clause struck down in Johnson.
Notwithstanding the difficulties in defining and measuring "substantial
similarity," the Prudholm court explained in a footnote, "[w]e do not find the
phrase 'substantially similar' to be ambiguous, and thus need not resort to
extratextual factors [in interpreting the statute].,152 And yet the court
appeared to "measure" "substantially similar" using factors not appearing in
the statute, stating "[w]e further hold that the elements must be substantially
similar with respect to the individual or public interests protected and the
impact of the elements on the seriousness of the offenses.""53 Whether or
not these factors would be considered "extratextual," the difficulty in
defining "substantially similar" is irresistibly analogous to the difficulty in
defining the "serious potential risk" phrase of the ACCA residual clause.14
Thus, under the first test provided in Johnson, the foreign jurisdiction clause
of the Texas habitual offender statute should be struck down as void for
vagueness because it combines a categorical analysis with an ambiguous
liability standard, thereby "produc[ing] more unpredictability and
arbitrariness than the Due Process Clause tolerates.""'
C. The Texas Courts' Inability to Establish a Clear and Consistent
Standard for Applying Texas Penal Code §12.42
The Johnson Court set forth a separate consideration for finding a
statute impermissibly vague-inability to establish a clear and consistent
standard for analyzing crimes under the residual clause. 16 In fact, Texas
courts have repeatedly failed to establish a clear standard for the foreign
jurisdiction clause of Texas' habitual offender statute.
149. Compare the analysis of "substantially similar" inPrudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 594-95, with
the analysis of the residual clause in Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2581. (Alito, J., dissenting).
150. Compare Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 594-95, with Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2581 (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
151. Id.
152. Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 595 n.21.
153. Id. at 595.
154. Compare Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 594-95, with Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2581. (Alito, J.,
dissenting).
155. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2557-58 (citations omitted).
156. Id. at 2560.
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As previously explained, in the 2003 case White v. State, the court
defined the inquiry under the foreign jurisdiction clause as revolving around
the elements rather than the facts of the underlying case.5 7 The court had
no choice; the statutory text explicitly uses the term "elements."5  While
White is undoubtedly correct, so far as it goes, it still fails to establish any
kind of clarity or predictability in applying "substantially similar" when it
comes to particular convictions. Nor does it stipulate which factors may and
may not be considered when determining "substantial similarity."15 9 Later
Texas appellate opinions cite Ex Parte White, in which the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reexamined the facts of White in an effort to illustrate the
lack of transparency in judicial analysis of the "substantially similar"
language.16 0 As a result, following White and Ex Parte White, the Prudholm
court in 2008 established a "parallel" test to help clarify "substantially
similar." 6 ' Yet the application of the "parallel" test failed to generate a more
transparent and robust analysis.162
For example, in Wagner v. State, the court concluded that an Ohio
"corruption of a minor" statute was "substantially similar" to the Texas
statute for "sexual assault."163 The court compared the elements of the Texas
statute to the Ohio statute. '6 4 The Texas sexual assault statute explains that
a person is guilty if the "person intentionally or knowingly 'causes the
penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means." "6 5 The
Ohio statute states: "[I]n sexual conduct with another, who is not the spouse
of the offender, when the offender knows other such person is thirteen years
of age or older but less than sixteen years of age, or the offender is reckless
in that regard." 6 6 The Wagner court then referred to Prudholm and stated,
"providing that 'substantially similar' elements of different statutes will
'parallel' each other . . .. We conclude the elements of the Ohio offense for
which appellant was convicted are substantially similar to the elements of an
157. White v. State, 2003 WL 865351, at *3 (Tex. App. Mar. 6, 2003).
158. See Tex. Penal Code § 12.42(c)(2)(B)(v) (2017).
159. See Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 593-94 (emphasizing White andExParte White's inability
to provide a clear test for applying the "substantially similar" language, and outlining a test for
defining "substantial similarity").
160. Id.
161. Prudholmv. State, 274 S.W.3d 236, 239 (Tex. App. 2008).
162. Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 596.
163. Wagner v. State, Nos. 14-07-00906-CR, 14-07-00907-CR, 2009 WL 838187, at *15
(Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2009).
164. Id.
165. Id. (quoting Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.011(a)(2)(A) (2009)).
166. Id. (quoting Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2907.04 (2007)).
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offense listed." 6 7  The Wagner court's analysis ended here without any
explanation of why the court found the two statutes' elements parallel. The
consistent lack of analysis generated from the "parallel" test propelled the
Prudholm court in 2011 to revisit the "substantially similar" analysis.68
Prudholm provided both a definition of "substantially similar" and a
metric for measuring "substantial similarity."16 9 The court departed from the
"parallel" test and held that, to satisfy the "substantially similar"
requirement, "the elements being compared pursuant to Texas Penal Code
Section 12.42(c)(2)(B)(v) must display a high degree of likeness, but may be
less than identical."17 0 The court then stated that the metric for determining
"high degree of likeness" would require "the elements . . . [to] be
substantially similar with respect to the individual or public interests
protected and the impact of the elements on the seriousness of the
offenses." Applying this new test to the case before it, the court compared
the elements of Texas's "aggravated kidnapping" to California's "sexual
battery" statute,17 2 holding that the two statutes were not "substantially
similar."173 The court first noted "the difference between the sexual elements
of the offenses," finding "sexual battery contains a conduct element
requiring the touching of an intimate part, whereas aggravated kidnapping
contains a specific intent element requiring the intent to commit a non-
consensual sex act. " However, and more importantly in the court's view,
were the differences in the "restraint" elements in the respective statutes:
[S]exual battery requires only an "unlawful restraint," . . . interpreted
as the control of a person's liberty, against his will, by words, acts or
authority of the perpetrator aimed at depriving the person's liberty...
aggravated kidnapping requires an "abduction," which is an "unlawful
restraint"-a substantial interference with the person's liberty, by
moving the person from one place to another or by confining the
person-committed with the specific intent to prevent the victim's
liberation by secreting or holding him in a place where he is not likely
to be found or using or threatening to use deadly force. The additional,
167. Wagnerv. State, Nos. 14-07-00906-CR, 14-07-00907-CR, 2009 WL 838187, at *15.
168. Prudholmv. State, 333 S.W.3d 590, 595 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
169. Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 594-95.
170. Id. at 594.
171. Id. at 595.
172. Id. at 596-99.
173. Id. at 599.
174. Prudholmv. State, 333 S.W.3d 590, 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).
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substantive specific-intent component of "abduction" suggests that
the restraint elements do not display a high degree of likeness. 175
The first passage contains the initial inquiry, namely, strict comparison
of the elements. The court explicated its second test by discussing the
"individual or public" interests protected by the two laws.'7 6 The court found
that the individual liberty interests of the laws differed.'7 7 "The California
'unlawful restraint' element protects individuals' liberty interests, while the
Texas 'abduction' element goes beyond protecting liberty interests to protect
against the considerable risk of death or serious bodily injury involved in an
abduction." 7" Building on these liberty interests, the court analyzed the third
prong of its newly established test, "the impact of the elements on the
seriousness of the offense."17 9 There it held that "the difference between the
restraint elements causes a great difference in the seriousness of the offenses,
as demonstrated by the punishments available."so The court held the
disparity in severity of punishment weighed in favor of holding these statutes
"unsubstantially similar."'s' The court relied specifically on the fact that
"sexual battery exposes a defendant to a maximum sentence of four years,
whereas aggravated kidnapping exposes a defendant to a maximum sentence
of life or ninety-nine years. ,182 Although the Prudholm court delivered a
stronger and more transparent analysis than previous courts, the test it
established still lacked sufficient predictability.
This lack of clarity was reflected in a 2012 case, Outland v. State.
Although the court in Outland identified all the elements in each statutory
offense and also cited the appellant's and state's arguments with respect to
these elements,183 the Outland court's analysis failed to compare, or
adequately devote consideration to,8 4 the first prong of the Prudholm test,
which requires comparison of the bare text of the elements in the statute. 115
The Outland court cites each parties' arguments with respect to the first
175. Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 599 (citations omitted).
176. Id.
177. Id. at 599-600.
178. Id. 599.
179. Id. at 595.
180. Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 595.
181. Id. at 599-600.
182. Id.
183. Outland v. State, 389 S.W.3d 346, 348-49 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
184. Outland, 389 S.W.3d at 348-49.
185. Id. at 348-49.
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prong of the Prudholm test, but the court provides no individual analysis of
the first Prudholm prong. ' 6  Rather, the court states "we agree with the
State," but proceeds to explain only its agreement with the analysis of
"individual and private interests protected" as well as the "seriousness of the
offense" analysis provided in the state's brief' 8 7  It thus remains unclear
whether the Outland court agrees with the state's analysis of the first prong
of Prudholm 's test. More importantly, Outland's lack of analysis with
respect to the textual elements either misconstrues Prudholm 's test or
presents a new test entirely-either of which still fails to establish a clear
and consistent standard.
In addition to the potential confusion regarding the emphasis on
statutory elements, the Prudholm court found that the statutes in question
lacked similarity under all three tests leaving the issue unresolved."" This
leaves courts, and individuals alike, to wonder which of these factors is most
important. Because of this ambiguity, the court in Anderson v. State was forced
to devote significant time to reexplaining and reshaping the Prudholm test.189
In Anderson, the court clarified the Prudholm test on a few key grounds.
First, the court explained that the inquiry was not in fact a weighing of three
independent factors, but rather a two-part test.190 After redefining the
structure of the test, the court explained that the first inquiry should focus on
the "high degree of likeness" between the textual elements. 191 The Anderson
court also took lengths to emphasize that "high degree of likeness" could not
be found when an out-of-state statute proscribed conduct more broadly than
a Texas statute, or when an out-of-state statute proscribed less severe conduct
than a Texas statute.192 The lengths the Anderson court took to describe the
"high degree of likeness" inquiry arguably indicates continued confusion
over how to define and apply the first prong of the test. Following the
explanation of the first prong, the court then stated that the second prong of
the Prudholm test included a "two-step analysis."l93 This required the
individual or public interests in statutes be similar, "and [mandated] the
186. Outland, 389 S.W.3d at 349.
187. Id.
188. Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 599-600.
189. See Castle v. State, 402 S.W.3d 895, 901 (Tex. App. 2013) ("In Andersonv. State ... the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recently re-addressed the process first outlined by the court in
Prudholm for determining if an out-of-state sexual offense contains "substantially similar"
elements to a listed Texas sexual offense.").
190. Andersonv. State, 394 S.W.3d 531, 535-37 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
191. Anderson, 394 S.W.3d at 535.
192. Id. at 536.
193. Anderson, 394 S.W.3d at 535.
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impact of the elements on the seriousness of the offenses" 94 be similar.19 5
Hence, the Anderson court established not only a new framework for the
Prudholm test, but also affirmed that both factors of the second prong need
to be satisfied to enhance a defendant's sentence.
The court then defined "individual or public interest," which the
Prudholm court did not do, by stating "similarity" exists "if there is a 'similar
danger to society' that the statute is trying to prevent.",19 6 Next, the court
defined similarity between the "impact[s] on the seriousness of the offenses,"
which Prudholm also failed to do, by stating "the court must then determine
if the class, degree, and punishment range of the two offenses are
substantially similar." 9 7 Finally, the Anderson court clarified the Prudholm
test by deciding that "[N]o single factor in the analysis is dispositive, so a
court must weigh all factors before making a determination. That
determination must be made with sensitivity because the defendant is subject
to an automatic life sentence."98 The Anderson court's restructuring and
redefining of the Prudholm test, as well as the Anderson court's inclusion of
a final consideration-"sensitivity" during judgment-reinforces the sense
of confusion in the Prudholm test.
The persistent lack of clarity is arguably present in a more recent case
that has applied the Anderson revision of the Prudholm test. In 2016, a Texas
appellate court's decision in Lott v. State addressed the question of whether
a Colorado "sexual assault" statute was "substantially similar" to a Texas
"indecency with a child" statute.199 The court in Lott applied Anderson 's
revised Prudholm test.20 0 However, the Lott court strayed from this test
when it held the two statutes "substantially similar" even though "the
Colorado statute prohibits a wider range of touching with respect to adult
victims than the Texas statute, [and] also includes specifically prohibited
touching of child victims.,,201 Holding these two statutes "substantially
similar" under this rationale directly contradicts the Anderson court's
contemplation of the test, because as Anderson explains:
194. The court in Anderson italicizes the "and" in this section of the Prudholm court's analysis.
195. Anderson, 394 S.W.3d at 536 (quoting Prudholm v. State, 333 S.W.3d 590, 595 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011)).
196. Anderson, 394 S.W.3d at 536.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 537.
199. Lott, 2016 WL 1298962, at *5 (Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2009).
200. Id. at *6 (Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2009).
201. Id. at *6-*8.
216 [Vol. 45:1
IMPACTS OF JOHNSON v. UNITED STATES
The out-of-state offense cannot be markedly broader than or distinct
from the Texas prohibited conduct. For instance, in Prudholm, the
California offense prohibited "touching" of an "intimate part,"
whereas the Texas offense proscribed the "penetration or contact" of
a person's "anus" or "sexual organ." We held that the two statutes
"encompass[ed] a markedly different range of conduct," and "[w]hile
the elements . . . may be similar in a general sense, they do not display
the high degree of likeness required to be substantially similar." There
are many more "intimate parts" covered under the California statute
than the specific subset of "intimate parts"-the "anus" and "sexual
202organ -listed in the Texas statute.
Looking directly at the statutes involved in Lott, two aspects make the
statutes dissimilar. First, the Colorado statute specifically proscribes "sexual
contact, intrusion or penetration," whereas the Texas statute refers only to
"touching." 2 03 This indicates that the conduct listed in the Colorado statute
"encompass[es] a markedly different range of conduct" than the Texas
statute.204 Second, the Colorado statute proscribes different "intimate parts"
under the term "sexual conduct" than the Texas statute.205 The court in Lott
specifically identifies "external genitalia or the perineum or the anus or the
buttocks or the pubes or the breast of any person" whereas the Texas statute
limits "intimate parts" to the "anus, breast, or any part of the genitals."206
Again, this raises issues broached in Prudholm, where the court held two
statutes insufficiently similar when the only difference in "'intimate parts'
covered under the California statute" was areas like the "buttocks."207
Moreover, the application of the Prudholm test in Lott appears, if not incorrect,
at the very least confusing, given the degree of difference in the "conduct" and
range of "intimate parts" proscribed under the Colorado statute.
It is also worth noting that, much like the statistical analyses Justice
Scalia found lacking in Sykes and Chambers, here the "interests protected"
by any given statute may not be defined in the statute, adding more confusion
to the Prudholm test later re-worked in Anderson.208 For example, in Castle
202. Andersonv. State, 394 S.W.3d 531,536 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citations omitted).




207. Compare Lott, WL 1298962, at *6-*8 with Prudholmv. State, 333 S.W.3d 590, 596-99
(Tex. Crim. App. 2011)).
208. Compare Johnsonv. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2559 (2015) with Castle v. State, 402
S.W.3d 895, 905 (Tex. App. 2013).
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v. State, the court adopted the Anderson court's reshaping of the Prudholm
test, and, with respect to the "private or public interest protected" factor,
stated the following:
Although the Louisiana sexual battery statute appears to be designed
to protect from more than merely "offensive contact"-its "touching"
prohibition is directed at body parts considered to be "sexual" (anus
and genitals)-it appears the Louisiana legislature intended more
broadly to guard against "sexual" touching that could involve external
contact rather than the severe trauma of rape addressed by the Texas
sexual assault statute.209
As the "appears" language in the cited text suggests, the statute in
question does not specifically identify an individual or public interest to
protect. At best, a judge must guess at the legislature's intent, which seems
to mirror the type of arbitrary and inconsistency dangers identified by Justice
Scalia in his reference to Sykes and Chambers.210 The inherent dangers of
the current test, taken with the continued changes and overall inability to
establish a clear and consistent standard, reinforce the invalidity of the
foreign jurisdiction clause of the Texas habitual offender statute.
IV. Possible Remedies
Three distinct changes to Texas' foreign jurisdiction clause could
remedy the vagueness issues. The first option is to eliminate the foreign
jurisdiction clause entirely and prevent enhancement for out of state
offenses. However, in the event that courts or legislatures wish to maintain
a foreign jurisdiction clause, rather than strike the clause, the court could
abandon the categorical approach in favor of a circumstance-specific
approach. This problem could similarly be eliminated by crafting a clearer
statute and by applying a factual inquiry as opposed to a categorical
approach. Further, even if the courts still applied a categorical analysis, the
statute could still avoid a Johnson problem if the "substantially similar"
language was clarified. The following sections will explain these three
remedies.
209. Castle, 402 S.W.3d at 905 (emphasis added).
210. Compare Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2559 with Castle, 402 S.W.3d at 905.
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A. Adoption of a Circumstance Specific Approach
In the Johnson dissent, Justice Alito made an impassioned argument for
abandoning the categorical approach as opposed to striking down the
residual clause of the ACCA. 211 Justice Alito argued:
The Court . .. admits that, "[a] s a general matter, we do not doubt the
constitutionality of laws that call for the application of a qualitative
standard such as "substantial risk" to real-world conduct." Its complaint
is that the residual clause 'requires application of the 'serious potential
risk' standard to an idealized ordinary case of the crime." Thus,
according to the Court, ACCA's residual clause is unconstitutionally
vague because its standard must be applied to "an idealized ordinary
case of the crime" and not, like the vast majority of the laws in the
Solicitor General's appendix, to "real-world conduct."212
Even if a statute contains ambiguity, the problem may be resolved
through application of unambiguous facts, and, as Justice Alito pointed out,
even the majority opinion "all but concedes that the residual clause would be
constitutional if it applied to 'real-world conduct."' 2 13 Justice Alito bolstered
his argument by invoking the constitutional canon of a presumption against
finding statutes unconstitutional.214  Yet the central holding of Johnson
provides a more straightforward justification for moving to a factual
analysis.215  Factual analysis does not raise the hypothetical "judicial
imaginings" dangers condemned in Johnson.2 1 6 Although it is beyond the
scope of this Note, it is not at all clear that moving to a factual analysis would
trigger a jury trial right, as "it is questionable whether the Sixth Amendment
creates a right to a jury trial in this situation."2 17 Still, given the manifest
difficulty in essentially retrying old convictions from other states, the Texas
courts and legislature should consider alternative remedies before
abandoning the "categorical approach." Another potentially fruitful ground
for discovering such alternative remedies is to see how other states enhance
foreign jurisdiction convictions.
211. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2577 (Alito, J., dissenting).
212. Id. (citations omitted).
213. Id. at 2578.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2557-58.
216. Johnsonv. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2557-58 (2015).
217. Id. at 2580-81 (citing Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)).
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B. A Clear State Statute with a Factual Inquiry
California courts have avoided the Johnson problem by using the
following approach. First, the California courts do not apply a pure
categorical approach but instead allow consideration of the facts of
conviction during the enhancement stage.2 18 Second, California courts require
direct overlap between the out-of-state statute and the enhancing statute.2 19
This avoids the Johnson problem because the language of the statute is more
tansparent and less open-ended than Texas' foreign jurisdiction clause,
requiring exact overlap on "all of the elements of a particular . .. felony"2 20 as
opposed to allowing some unspecifiable amount of deviation across statutes,
as in the Texas habitual offender statute.2 21 Adopting California's statute and
analysis could cure the vagueness problem in Texas' habitual offender statute.
To mirror the California law, Texas courts and legislatures would need to: (1)
abandon the pure categorical approach" and opt for a "circumstance-specific
approach," and (2) strike the offending "substantially similar" language in
favor of language that requires "equivalence" between elements. Making both
of these changes would not only mirror the California approach, but would
218. The following California cases reinforce California's use of a circumstance-specific
approach as opposed to a pure categorical approach. See People v. Riel, 22 Cal. 4th 1153, 1204-
05 (2000) ("prosecution may go behind the least adjudicated elements of prior felony, and submit
evidence of prior crime as it was actually committed, in order to prove that it would have been a
felony in California, and thus may support enhancement."); People v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 4th 253,
261-62 (1998) ("the prosecution [is] entitled to go beyond the least adjudicated elements of the ...
conviction and use the entire record to prove that defendant had in fact personally inflicted great
bodily injury (§ 1192.7, subd. (c)(8)) or personally used a dangerous or deadly weapon (§ 1192.7,
subd. (c)(23))."); In re Jones, 27 Cal. App. 4th 1032, 1047-48 (1994) (quoting People v. Myers, 5
Cal. 4th 1193, 1201 (1993)) ("[T]he trier of fact must be permitted to go beyond the least
adjudicated elements of the offense, to implement the purpose of the electorate in incorporating
paragraphs (18) and (24) of section 1192.7 into section 667 (a), 'and to consider, if not precluded
by the rules of evidence or other statutory limitation, evidence found within the entire record of the
foreign conviction."'); People v. Guerrero, 44 Cal. 3d 343, 355 (1988) ("To allow the trier of fact
to look to the entire record of the conviction is certainly reasonable: it promotes the efficient
administration of justice and, specifically, furthers the evident intent of the people in establishing
an enhancement for [a subdivision] that refers to conduct, not a specific crime.").
219. See Cal Penal Code § 667.71 (2006) ("A prior conviction in another jurisdiction for an
offense that, if committed in California . . .shall constitute a prior conviction of a particular serious
and/or violent felony if the prior conviction in the other jurisdiction is for an offense that includes
all of the elements of a particular violent felony."); see also Prudholm v. State, 333 S.W.3d 590,
592 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). ("Many states significantly enhance punishment for offenders who
have been previously convicted of . . . [California courts enhance out of state convictions if] (iii)
the elements of the foreign offense are the same as the elements of an enumerated offense.").
220. Cal. Penal Code § 667.71.
221. Tex. Penal Code § 12.42 (c)(2)(B)(v) (2017).
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also eliminate a Johnson problem.222 Alternatively, Texas courts could
continue to apply a categorical approach if the courts adopted a more clearly
worded foreign jurisdiction clause.
C. Adoption of New York's Foreign Jursidiction Clause
New York's foreign jurisdiction clause provides an example of a clear
statute that simultaneously requires application of a pure "categorical
approach."2 23 Like California, New York allows foreign offenses to qualify
for sentencing enhancement if the out-of-state conviction "includes all of the
essential elements of [the qualifying New York] felony."22 4 Courts have
interpreted "all of the essential elements" language to mean "equivalence"
or "exactness" between the elements.22 5 In this way, the New York statute
provides less room for ambiguity and interpretation than Texas' habitual
offender statute, because the window for interpreting "exactness" is
narrower than the broad spectrum available in "substantially similar." While
New York's foreign jurisdiction clause differs substantially from the Texas
statute, New York courts apply a statutory analysis that is analogous to the
analysis applied by Texas courts.226
New York courts have defined "[the] inquiry [under New York Penal
Law section 70.04] as limited to a comparison of the crimes' elements as
they are respectively defined in the out-of-state and New York penal
statutes."22 7 Courts comparing out-of-state offenses and New York offenses
"may not consider the factual allegations in the underlying indictments, 'as
it is immaterial that the crime actually committed in the foreign jurisdiction
222. See generally Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015) (holding only the pure
categorical approach applied to an ambiguously worded statute violates the Due Process Clause).
223. See Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 592 n.9 (defining the New York statute, stating New
York requires "the elements of the foreign offense are the same as the elements of an
enumerated offense.").
224. N.Y. Pen. Law § 70.04(b) (1999).
225. Compare Saracinav. Arus, 2010 WL 3529352, at *5 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2010), report
and recommendation adopted, WL 3529339 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 8, 2010), aff'd, 452 Fed. Appx. 44
(2d Cir. 2011) (quoting People v. Gonzalez, 61 N.Y.2d 586, 589 (1984)) ("under New York law, a
foreign or out-of-state conviction can [qualify] . . . only if the foreign conviction includes 'elements
are equivalent to those of a New York felony."') with Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 592 n.9 (defining
the New York statute, stating New York requires "the elements of the foreign offense are the same
as the elements of an enumerated offense.").
226. Compare Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 599 with Saracina, WL 3529352, at *5.
227. People v. Muniz, 74 N.Y.2d 464, 467-68 (1989).
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may be the equivalent of a felony in New York."' 2 28  As previously
explained, Texas courts also apply the same type of categorical approach2 2 9
applied by New York courts, meaning Texas courts could adopt the
"equivalence" language in New York's statute to avoid the risk of ambiguity
and open-endedness at issue in Texas Penal Code section 12.42.
Conclusion
In 2015, the Supreme Court in Johnson held a federal three-strike law
enhancement scheme constitutionally void for vagueness.23 0  The Court
found the residual clause of the ACCA unconstitutional on two independent
grounds.23 ' First, the Court held the intersection of a pure categorical
approach with an ambiguously worded statute violated notice provisions of
the Due Process Clause.232 In addition, the Court identified an inability to
create a clear and consistent standard of application as a second independent
ground for holding the residual clause unconstitutional.233  Although the
Court's holding specifically applied to a federal sentencing enhancement
scheme, the holding is undoubtedly applicable to states through the
Fourteenth Amendment's incorporation of the Fifth Amendment Due
Process Clause.234
The holding in Johnson squarely applies to the "substantially similar"
language of the foreign jurisdiction clause of Texas' habitual offender
statute. Johnson applies equally here because Texas courts apply a pure
"categorical approach,"23 5 and because the "substantially similar" language
has rendered the foreign jurisdiction clause ambiguous and confusing to
courts applying the law. In addition, Texas courts have a history of applying
the foreign jurisdiction clause inconsistently and unclearly. Accordingly, the
foreign jurisdiction clause fails under Johnson 's second independent
vagueness holding.
228. People v. White, 2014 WL 4436400, at *2 (Sup. Ct. 2014), aff'd, 48 N.Y.S.3d 584 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2017) (quoting People v. Ramos, 19 N.Y.3d 417, 419 (2012), and People v. Olah, 300
N.Y. 96, 98-99 (1949)).
229. See Prudholm, 333 S.W.3d at 593-95, 599.
230. Johnsonv. U.S., 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2558 (2015).
231. Id. at 2557.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 2558.
234. See generally Hurtado v. People of the State of Cal., 110 U.S. 516, 534-35 (1884).
235. See People v. White, 2014 WL 4436400, at *3 (Sup. Ct. 2014), White v. State of Tex.,
2003 WL 865351, at *3 (Tex. App. 2003), andPrudholmv. State, 333 S.W.3d 590, 596-99 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011).
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If Texas courts find the Texas habitual offender law vague under
Johnson, the Texas courts and/or legislature will have to innovate to remedy
the constitutional infirmity. The legislature could abandon the statute
entirely. Alternatively, the courts may save the statute by abandoning the
pure categorical approach in favor of a fact-specific approach.236 Finally, the
legislature could adopt the foreign jurisdiction enhancement scheme of
another state, such as California,23 7 or New York.238 Each of these options
would cure the vagueness problem by providing substantially more notice to
offenders victimized by the statute.
236. Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2577 (Alito, J., dissenting).
237. See Cal. Penal Code § 667.71 (2006).
238. N.Y. Pen. Law §70.04(b) (1999).
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